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FREE SPEECH AND HOSTILE ENVIRONMENTS
J.M. Balkin*
One major concern about sexual harassment law is that
employers will restrict employee speech in order to avoid
hostile environment liability, thus violating free speech
principles.  In this Essay, Professor Balkin argues that this
“collateral censorship” is constitutionally permissible when
there are good grounds for vicarious liability.  Because
employers actively control workplace culture, and because
they are better able to prevent hostile environments than
individual employees, vicarious liability for employee
speech is more justified than in the case of distributors or
common carriers.
Professor Balkin also argues that captive audience
doctrine, generally thought to apply only to speech in the
home, is actually better suited to workplace speech.  Hostile
environments are a method of sex discrimination that
maintains gender segregation; a hostile environment does
its work precisely through making the employee a captive
audience.
The Essay concludes that First Amendment challenges
to sexual harassment law should not become a defense of
employer prerogatives presented in the guise of worker
liberties.  Without the incentives created by sexual
harassment law, employees will not be freed from
censorship; they will simply be remitted to the economic and
social control of employers.
Does sexual harassment law conflict with the First Amendment?
A number of commentators now argue that it does.1  Generally, these
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1. See, e.g., Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship:  Hostile-Environment
Harassment and the First Amendment, 52 Ohio St. L.J. 481, 548 (1991) [hereinafter Browne,
Title VII as Censorship]; Kingsley R. Browne, Workplace Censorship:  A Response to Professor
Sangree, 47 Rutgers L. Rev. 579, 580–85 (1995); Jules B. Gerard, The First Amendment in a
Hostile Environment:  A Primer on Free Speech and Sexual Harassment, 68 Notre Dame L. Rev.
1003, 1033–34 (1993); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39
UCLA L. Rev. 1791, 1846 (1992) [hereinafter Volokh, Freedom of Speech]; Eugene Volokh,
How Harassment Law Restricts Free Speech, 47 Rutgers L. Rev. 563, 567 (1995) [hereinafter
Volokh, How Harassment]; Eugene Volokh, What Speech Does “Hostile Work Environment”
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objections focus on employer liability for speech by employers and
employees that creates hostile environments.  Virtually no one finds
fault with regulating quid pro quo sexual harassment:  Employers
who tell employees “sleep with me or you’re fired” make threats that
are not protected by the First Amendment.2  In this Essay I offer an
account of why hostile environment doctrine, properly interpreted,
does not violate freedom of speech.3  I address two basic kinds of
objections.  The first concedes that the creation of a hostile
environment is not protected speech, but argues that fear of Title VII
liability will lead employers to censor employee speech and that this
chilling effect violates the First Amendment.4  I hope to show why
these concerns are overstated through a discussion of the idea of
collateral censorship—an important but largely overlooked concept
in the theory of free speech.  Collateral censorship occurs when A
censors B out of fear that the government will hold A liable for the
effects of B’s speech.  I believe that the question of when collateral
censorship is a permissible effect of regulation and when it is
unconstitutional will be increasingly important in the law of
telecommunications and cyberspace.  In this case, however, the
concept of collateral censorship helps us understand the
constitutionality of hostile environment law.
The second, and more radical attack on hostile environment
liability argues that when employers create a hostile environment
that materially alters working conditions to the disadvantage of
women and minorities, they are engaged in protected speech.5
Rebutting this more radical attack helps us understand another
important but undertheorized category in First Amendment law—
Harassment Law Restrict?, 85 Geo. L.J. 627, 647 (1997) [hereinafter Volokh, What Speech].
2. See, e.g., Nadine Strossen, The Tensions Between Regulating Workplace Harassment and
the First Amendment:  No Trump, 71 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 701, 704 (1995) (“Even the most diehard
free speech absolutist recognizes that the speech involved in quid pro quo harassment is
tantamount to threats or extortion.”); Volokh, Freedom of Speech, supra note 1, at 1800 (quid pro
quo harassment is no more protected than “any other form of threat or extortion”).
3. In this Essay I shall primarily be concerned with sexual harassment, and, to a lesser
extent, racial harassment.  I do not discuss religious harassment.  I think that accusations of
religious harassment often raise distinctive problems.  For example, some employees might object
to proselytization by co-workers or provocative displays of religious paraphernalia.  Although
both of these can undoubtedly make workers feel uncomfortable, neither is the precise equivalent
of racist and sexist speech designed to drive blacks and women from the workplace.  The rules
that govern these situations must be tailored to take these differences into account.
4. See, e.g., Browne, Title VII as Censorship, supra note 1, at 505, 510–13, 548; Volokh,
Freedom of Speech, supra note 1, at 1809–14; Volokh, What Speech, supra note 1, at 635–37.
5. See, e.g., Browne, Title VII as Censorship, supra note 1, at 544–47.  For related reasons,
Eugene Volokh argues that hostile environment law should be limited to face-to-face verbal
harassment directed at particular individuals.  See Volokh, Freedom of Speech, supra note 1, at
1846.  This implies that other forms of communicative harassment, even if they materially alter
working conditions to the disadvantage of women and minorities, are protected speech and may
not be limited on the basis of content, viewpoint, or subject matter.  See id. at 1849.
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captive audience doctrine.  It also helps connect the captive audience
doctrine more closely to what I regard to be the deeper purposes of
antidiscrimination law.
I.  COLLATERAL CENSORSHIP
Although threats are not protected by the First Amendment,
hostile environments do not always involve threats.  A hostile
environment is made up of individual acts of discriminatory speech
and other conduct by all the persons who inhabit a workplace,
including managers, employees, and even occasionally clients and
customers.  In hostile environments, “the workplace is permeated
with ‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult’ that is
‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the
victim’s employment and create an abusive working
environment . . . .’”6  Some of this behavior may be directed at
particular employees; other elements may be directed at no one in
particular but may help foster an abusive environment.  Even if
individual acts do not constitute a hostile environment separately,
they can be actionable when taken together.  The test is whether the
conduct, taken as a whole, would lead to an environment that the
employee reasonably perceives as abusive.7
Employers can be liable for maintaining a hostile work
environment even if management did not personally engage in any of
the predicate acts.  In Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth8 and
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,9 the Supreme Court held that
employers are liable for harassment by supervisory personnel,
subject to a number of affirmative defenses where the harassment did
not result in a tangible employment action like firing or demotion.10
6. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65, 67 (1986)).
7. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21–23.
8. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
9. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
10. The Supreme Court’s current doctrine is that
[a]n employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable
hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority
over the employee.  When no tangible employment action is taken, a defending employer may
raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the
evidence.  The defense comprises two necessary elements:  (a) that the employer exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that
the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.  While proof that an
employer had promulgated an anti-harassment policy with complaint procedure is not
necessary in every instance as a matter of law, the need for a stated policy suitable to the
employment circumstances may appropriately be addressed in any case when litigating the
first element of the defense.  And while proof that an employee failed to fulfill the
corresponding obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited to showing any
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The degree of vicarious liability for non-supervisory personnel (such
as co-workers) is still contested, but currently most courts hold an
employer liable if the employer knew or should have known of the
harassment and did not take prompt corrective action.11
Employers who want to minimize hostile environment liability
cannot merely prohibit individual instances of harassing conduct.
They must also limit conduct that might, in combination with other
conduct, contribute to a hostile environment.  Hence employers are
tempted to create prophylactic rules against all the potential
components of a hostile environment.  Some of these will be
unwelcome physical advances, assaults, and forms of abuse.  Others
will be largely verbal:  sexual jokes and innuendoes, taunts and
threats, sexually oriented cartoons, pictures, and pornography.  Some
of this verbal abuse may even be couched in political or factual
terms; for example, co-workers might  oppose affirmative action
programs for women or quote scientific studies arguing that women
are less competent at certain jobs.  Because employers have no
general interest in preserving employee speech rights unrelated to
efficiency, they will impose regulations as broad as they think
necessary to insulate themselves from liability.12  The most
important complaints about the constitutionality of sexual
harassment law stem from these incentives to censor employee
speech that might contribute to a hostile environment.13
The argument that sexual harassment law produces
unconstitutional employee censorship is actually an instance of a
more general problem in free speech law—a phenomenon I call
collateral censorship.14  Collateral censorship occurs when one
private party A has the power to control speech by another private
party B, the government threatens to hold A liable based on what B
says, and A then censors B’s speech to avoid liability.  The offending
speech may be defamatory, obscene, fraudulent, or a violation of
copyright.  In most situations A has greater incentives to censor B
unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure provided by the employer, a
demonstration of such failure will normally suffice to satisfy the employer’s burden under the
second element of the defense.  No affirmative defense is available, however, when the
supervisor’s harassment culminates in a tangible employment action, such as discharge,
demotion, or undesirable reassignment.
Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 765 (citation omitted).
11. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799 (collecting cases); see also Sexual Harassment, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11(d) (1998) (EEOC Guidelines applying negligence standard).
12. Employers are not completely free to censor employee speech, of course; they are also
constrained by wrongful discharge law, union rules, and civil service regulations.
13. See Browne, Title VII as Censorship, supra note 1, at 505, 510–13; Volokh, Freedom of
Speech, supra note 1, at 1809–14; Volokh, What Speech, supra note 1, at 635–37.
14. I borrow this term from Michael I. Meyerson, Authors, Editors, and Uncommon
Carriers:  Identifying the “Speaker” Within the New Media, 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 79, 116, 118
(1995).
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than B has to self-censor.  That is because B has an additional interest
in promoting his or her own speech that A usually lacks.  Hence A
can be expected to censor B collaterally with little regard for the
value of B’s speech to B or to society at large.
Although to my knowledge no court has yet recognized
collateral censorship as a distinct doctrinal category, it appears to be
a fairly common phenomenon.  For example, editors and publishers,
driven by fear of defamation suits, may refuse to run stories by their
reporters.  Internet service providers, fearing that they may be held
liable for contributory infringement of copyrighted materials, may
attempt to ban messages from parties suspected of disseminating
such materials.
Once one recognizes the ubiquity of the phenomenon, it should
be obvious that not all government regulation that leads to collateral
censorship is unconstitutional.  The question is which varieties are
permissible and which are not.  It is tempting but incorrect to argue
that collateral censorship is never unconstitutional because there is
no state action.  It is not the state that is censoring the employee or
the customer but a private party—the newspaper or the Internet
service provider.  In fact, there is state action in every case of
collateral censorship, because the government has created incentives
for private parties to censor each other.  Moreover, in virtually all
cases of collateral censorship, the government not only knows but
expects and desires that the private party will censor the unprotected
offending material, even if it does not know exactly how much
constitutionally protected material will also be censored in the
process.15
Even so, collateral censorship is not necessarily unconstitutional.
For example, the editors and the publishers of the New York Times
are liable for publishing defamatory articles written by their
reporters.  Hence editors and publishers of large metropolitan dailies
like the New York Times exercise considerable oversight over their
reporters’ stories in order to avoid liability or the costs of defending a
defamation lawsuit.  Often acting on the advice of attorneys, editors
and publishers severely edit or even discard much of what their
reporters produce, even when a reporter insists that a story is
accurate.  The reporter’s statements may be matters of intense public
concern and core political speech.  They may be constitutionally
protected so that the government could not impose liability for them
directly.  Nevertheless, reporters who insist on writing what the
15. See Browne, Title VII as Censorship, supra note 1, at 510–13 (arguing that state action
requirement is satisfied when employers censor employees); Volokh, Freedom of Speech, supra
note 1, at 1816–18 (arguing that state action exists when employers create anti-harassment
policies out of fear of government liability, but not if they create the same policies for other
reasons).
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editor or publisher forbids out of fear of possible liability may be
disciplined or even fired.
Do such limitations on employee speech violate the First
Amendment?  First Amendment law clearly does recognize
constitutional limitations on liability for defamation, embodied in
cases like New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,16 Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc.,17 and their progeny.  One reason for these limitations is the fear
that valuable speech will be chilled by liability for defamation.  But
the doctrines do not appear to make any distinction between chilling
the speech of editors and publishers and chilling the speech of their
employees, the reporters.  Both reporters and editors are entitled to
the same constitutional privilege.  Indeed, in Cantrell v. Forest City
Publishing Co., the Court approved of a jury charge which permitted
the imposition of vicarious liability upon a publisher for the knowing
falsehoods written by its staff writer.18  Here, in effect, the Court
allowed the jury to hold the publisher strictly liable for an
employee’s defamation.  Such a rule clearly gives a publisher strong
incentives to censor employee speech.  Yet the Court found no
constitutional problem with applying the traditional doctrines of
respondeat superior in this context.19
Federal securities laws require investment houses, brokerage
firms, investment advisors, and even corporate officials to avoid
making misleading statements about company profits, securities, and
related investments.  Companies are strictly regulated concerning
what they may say about these matters, particularly in highly
regulated procedures like proxy contests.20  Statements made by their
employees, even politically motivated statements, may subject them
to liability.  Thus, rational companies will often severely limit the
kinds of public statements their employees may make, and discipline
or terminate employees who disobey.  Do such rules violate the First
Amendment because they chill the speech, not of the organizations
16. 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964) (holding that First Amendment requires proof of actual malice
in libel actions brought by public officials against critics of their official conduct).
17. 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (extending New York Times rule to punitive damages sought
by private figures).
18. 419 U.S. 245, 253–54 (1974).
19. See id.  Employers could argue for a stronger and additional privilege to void the libel
laws on the grounds that fear of liability forces them to silence their employees more than they
would silence themselves.  For example, a newspaper might argue that defamatory statements
against private figures should be held to an actual malice standard rather than the negligence
standard permitted by Gertz, because newspapers will be likely to censor their employees much
more severely than they would censor their own speech under the negligence standard.  There is
no indication, however, that the Court applies a different standard for employers who publish the
speech of their employees and employers (or other persons) who publish their own speech.
20. See generally Burt Neuborne, The First Amendment and Government Regulation of
Capital Markets, 55 Brook. L. Rev. 5 (1989) (discussing the SEC’s regulation of false and
misleading speech about capital formation).
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themselves, but of their employees?
My sense is that neither of these situations presents a serious
First Amendment problem, even though both involve collateral
censorship.  But this simply raises the question of when collateral
censorship is constitutional, and when it is constitutionally
troublesome.
The question we should ask is whether it makes sense, given the
purposes of a regulatory regime, and the kind of harm that the
legislature has a right to prevent, to treat the private censor and the
private speaker as the “same speaker” for purposes of First
Amendment law.  Clearly this judgment is a legal fiction.  The two
speakers are not really identical, but the law is entitled to treat them
as if they were one, and to hold the first liable for what the second
does.  The claim that the censor and speaker are the “same speaker”
is just a shorthand way of saying that the private censor (the
employer) has the right to control the content of the speaker’s (the
employee’s) speech and that the private censor is properly
responsible for the harmful effects of that speech.
Why might it be permissible to hold one speaker liable for the
harms of another?  One reason is that the private censor and speaker
are part of the same enterprise that produces speech-related harm:
They either collectively produce a single product that causes harm (a
libelous publication), or their collective efforts create a harm or a risk
of harm (misleading or fraudulent information about investments).  A
second reason is that the private censor is in the best position to
avoid the harm.  For example, we might think that the private censor
is particularly good at distinguishing protected from unprotected
harmful speech, that the private censor can avoid harms more easily
and effectively than the speaker, or that the private censor has better
information than the speaker.
Thus, we can identify three considerations that justify treating
the private censor and the speaker as “the same speaker”: (1) the
private censor’s right to control the speech of the private speaker, (2)
the joint or collective production of a harm or danger of harm, and
(3) the private censor’s superior ability to avoid the harm.  Not
surprisingly, these reasons for treating the private censor and the
speaker as “the same speaker” for purposes of First Amendment law
resemble traditional justifications for vicarious liability, in which
courts treat employer and employee as the “same tortfeasor” for
purposes of liability.21  (They also suggest why the Court found little
difficulty with the application of respondeat superior in Cantrell,
even though the use of that rule in the defamation context clearly
21. See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 69, at 499–501
(5th ed. 1984) (describing standard justifications for respondeat superior liability).
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chills the speech of reporters.)
It is easy to see why the justifications for vicarious liability are
relevant to the constitutionality of collateral censorship.  If we hold
the private censor responsible for the private speaker’s harmful
speech, it is reasonable to expect the private censor to censor.
Conversely, if we don’t want to encourage the private censor to
censor (because we value the free flow of ideas), we should ensure
that the private censor is not held responsible for the private
speaker’s harmful speech.  Thus, collateral censorship is most
acceptable from a First Amendment standpoint when vicarious
liability is most acceptable, and it is least acceptable from a First
Amendment standpoint when vicarious liability is least acceptable.
Moreover, these three considerations—the private censor’s right
to edit and control content, the joint production of the harm by
censor and speaker, and the private censor’s superior ability to avoid
the harm—help explain why collateral censorship does not seem to
violate the First Amendment even when the censor and speaker are
not employer and employee, or part of the same business enterprise.
Take the case of authors and publishing houses, for example.  Book
publishers employ legal staffs to inspect author manuscripts for
possible liability for defamation, fraud, or copyright infringement.
Publishers do so because they will suffer the consequences of their
authors’ violations of the law.  As a result, publishers often demand
that authors rewrite or even omit troublesome passages as a condition
of publication.  No one doubts that these practices affect authors’
practical ability to speak.  But this collateral censorship does not
violate their First Amendment rights, even when they engage in
explicitly political speech.  If defamation laws are constitutional with
respect to suits against the author directly, they are also
constitutional with respect to suits against the publisher, even though
the publisher clearly has different incentives from those of the author
and therefore will exercise collateral censorship in situations where
the author would not self-censor.
Thus, the case of the author and publisher is much like that of
the reporter and the editor.  Like the newspaper editor, the book
publisher possesses and exercises the right to editorial control over
how authors express themselves.  This editorial control over content
is the price that reporters or authors must pay if they want to publish
in a particular newspaper or in a book produced by a particular
publisher.
Conversely, collateral censorship seems to pose the greatest
constitutional problems when it is most troublesome to treat the
censor and the speaker as the “same speaker” for First Amendment
purposes.  The most obvious example occurs when courts and
legislatures impose liability for harmful speech on a distributor, a
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common carrier, or some other conduit that is not part of the same
business enterprise as the censored speaker, lacks the right to
exercise editorial control, and lacks information about the nature of
the content flowing through its channels.
In fact, the one Supreme Court case that comes closest to
recognizing the problem of collateral censorship seems premised on
this distinction.  In Smith v. California,22 a California statute made it
a crime for bookstore owners to stock books that were later judicially
determined to be obscene, even if the owner did not know of the
books’ contents.  The Supreme Court struck down the statute,
arguing that “if the bookseller is criminally liable without knowledge
of the contents . . . he will tend to restrict the books he sells to those
he has inspected; and thus the State will have imposed a restriction
upon the distribution of constitutionally protected as well as obscene
literature.”23  Hence, “[t]he bookseller’s self-censorship, compelled
by the State, would be a censorship affecting the whole public,
hardly less virulent for being privately administered.”24  What the
Court calls “self-censorship” in Smith is actually collateral
censorship that arises from the different incentives of the bookseller
and the book author.25  In Smith the Court saw through (or, more
correctly, did not even notice) the state action objection that a private
party was doing the censoring.26
Note that the Supreme Court suggested that it was unfair to hold
the bookstore owner liable because the bookstore owner lacked
information about the content of each and every book.  This injustice
is not merely unfairness to the individual bookseller.  Nor is it purely
a concern about inefficient sorting. If our only concern were keeping
harmful speech out of bookstores, we could accept a blunderbuss
approach.  But in the First Amendment area we should be as
concerned with false positives (non-obscene books that don’t get
stocked) as with false negatives (obscene books that wind up on the
bookstore shelves).  We should be concerned about closing off
means of expression to the authors on the one hand, and closing off
information to audiences on the other.  That is why it is a bad idea,
from a First Amendment perspective, to squeeze the distributor (such
as a bookstore owner or a common carrier) in the middle.  Concerns
about mismatched incentives and inadequate information lie at the
22. 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
23. Id. at 153.
24. Id. at 154.
25. See Meyerson, supra note 14, at 118 n.259.
26. This may be due to the fact that the Court describes the phenomenon as “self-
censorship.”  Because of the state statute, the bookstore owner cannot sell the books he or she
might otherwise want to.  But the most serious form of censorship is actually the censorship of
the book’s author and publisher, not of the bookstore, which acts mostly as a distributor or
conduit for the censored speech.
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heart of the constitutional objection to collateral censorship.
The common law of defamation features similar policy concerns
about collateral censorship, although the courts do not use the term
and the relevant doctrines are not constitutionalized.  The law of
defamation recognizes the problem of collateral censorship through
what is called the distributor’s privilege.  Generally speaking, a
person who repeats a defamatory statement is as liable for
publication as the original speaker (assuming the person also acts
with the requisite degree of fault).27  However, a distributor of
information, such as a newsstand or a bookstore, is generally not
held to this standard unless the distributor knows of the publication’s
defamatory content.28 The fear is that if distributors were held to be
publishers, distributors might restrict the kinds of books and
magazines they sold, greatly reducing the public’s access to
protected expression.
To receive the common law privilege, a distributor does not have
to be a common carrier, which must take on all customers without
oversight.29  Although distributors make some content-based
judgments—for example, in choosing what books or magazines to
stock—their editorial control is very different from and much more
limited than that of the book publisher or magazine editor.
In the telecommunications industry, collateral censorship poses a
genuine and recurrent constitutional problem:  Cable companies and
Internet service providers regularly act as conduits for the speech of
unrelated parties.  Treating them like publishers or editors would
have the predictable effects noted above.30  Thus, in the
27. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 578 (1977) (“Except as to those who only deliver
or transmit defamation published by a third person, one who repeats or otherwise republishes
defamatory matter is subject to liability as if he had originally published it.”).
28. See id. § 581 (“[O]ne who . . . delivers or transmits defamatory matter published by a
third person is subject to liability if, but only if, he knows or has reason to know of its defamatory
character.”).
29. A fortiori, telecommunications companies that act as common carriers receive the
distributor’s privilege.  See id. § 581 cmt. f; see also Anderson v. New York Tel. Co., 320 N.E.2d
647 (N.Y. 1974) (holding telephone company not liable for defamation delivered across
telephone lines).
30. Indeed, the argument for distributor privileges or other forms of reduced liability has
regularly been made in cyberspace, because Internet service providers and computer bulletin
boards are unable to supervise the content that flows through them. See, e.g., James Boyle,
Intellectual Property Policy Online:  A Young Person’s Guide, 10 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 47, 103
(1996); David J. Conner, Cubby v. Compuserve, Defamation Law on the Electronic Frontier, 2
Geo. Mason Indep. L. Rev. 227 (1993); Meyerson, supra note 14; Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Tort
Liability, the First Amendment, and Equal Access to Electronic Networks, 5 Harv. J.L. & Tech.
65, 106–08 (1992); Robert Charles, Note, Computer Bulletin Boards and Defamation:  Who
Should Be Liable?  Under What Standard?, 2 J.L. & Tech. 121, 145–50 (1987); Philip H. Miller,
Note, New Technology, Old Problem:  Determining the First Amendment Status of Electronic
Information Services, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 1147, 1197–1201 (1993); see also Religious Tech. Ctr.
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Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress extended a special
privilege to Internet service providers whose customers post
indecent, obscene, or “otherwise objectionable” matter in
cyberspace, declaring that, as a matter of law, they should not be
considered the publishers of such material.31
Hostile environment law surely produces collateral censorship.
But the collateral censorship does not involve a distributor or conduit
relationship.  I believe that the employer who censors employees for
fear of creating a hostile environment is more like the employer who
censors employees out of fear of liability for defamation or securities
fraud, and less like the Internet service provider who censors his or
her customers, or the bookstore owner who refuses to stock certain
books in order to avoid liability.
Unlike the case of the bookseller and the author, the employer
and employee in a hostile environment case are part of the same
business enterprise, and the employer has the contractual right to
control the employee’s speech and conduct.  Perhaps more
important, the law has good reasons to hold the employer
accountable for the acts of its employees.  First, the employer is
better able to see the larger picture about what conduct might
contribute to sex discrimination.  This is especially so given that
hostile environments emerge from a combination of behaviors that
not all employees may have knowledge of.  Second, and for similar
reasons, the employer is also better able than individual employees to
prevent hostile environments from emerging, especially when they
result from collective actions that no individual employee may be
able or willing to prevent.
Third, precisely because the creation of a hostile environment
does not stem from any single act, but from many acts taken
together, it makes sense to treat the harm to equal opportunity in the
workplace as a single harm.  Indeed, because collective action
problems may reduce the ability or the incentives of individual
employees to prevent hostile environments, it may make even more
sense to treat employer and employees as a “single speaker” engaged
in a single harm than it does in the case of defamation or securities
v. Netcom On-Line Communication Serv., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1377–78 (N.D. Cal. 1995)
(“If Usenet servers were responsible for screening all messages coming through their systems,
this could have a serious chilling effect on what some say may turn out to be the best public
forum for free speech yet devised.”).
31. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (Supp. II 1996); see Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 49–
52 (D.D.C. 1998).  In fact, the 1996 Act gives Internet service providers more protection than the
traditional distributor’s privilege, because knowledge of defamatory content is not sufficient to
subject them to liability.  See Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327, 331–32 (4th Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998).
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fraud.32
Fourth, the employer faces incentives to acquiesce in hostile
environments that have no analogue in defamation or securities fraud
situations.  This makes the case for employer liability—and the need
for incentives to police employees—even stronger.  Sexual
harassment is a form of sex discrimination that works to keep jobs
and employment opportunities sex-segregated according to
traditional gender roles—for example, by keeping women out of
higher-paying construction positions and in lower-paying secretarial
positions, or by imposing obstacles to advancement for women even
in integrated workforces.33  Employers may accept (or ignore) sex
discrimination by their male employees (including discrimination
through sexual harassment) in order to avoid labor disruption and
preserve esprit de corps and loyalty among a particular class of
valuable (male) workers.
Why would employers acquiesce in sexual harassment by their
male employees even if employers had no particular bias against
women?  In theory, employers could save money by staffing jobs
with less well-paid women rather than with men, but this move might
produce enormous labor disruptions, even with non-unionized
workers.  Under these conditions, acquiescence in labor segregation
and reduction of employment opportunities to women is a second-
best solution to maximizing profits.  Employers will accept a sex-
segregated workforce with only a few token women in “male”
positions (enforced by many different forms of sex discrimination,
including employee harassment) as a compromise with existing male
employees who want to maintain higher wages and workplace
status.34
In short, the different incentives of employers and employees
may push them toward a common strategy.  Together the employer
and the employees create an undifferentiated “product”—a
workplace culture that distributes job opportunities by sex and
32. The argument for the constitutionality of collateral censorship in hostile environment
cases is in some ways even stronger than in defamation and securities fraud cases because most
courts currently hold the employer liable only if the employer knows or should have known of the
harassment and does not take prompt corrective action.  See supra text accompanying note 11.  In
other words, employers are not held strictly liable for employee speech (as in other vicarious
liability situations) but are only liable when they fail to exercise due care in rooting out and
remedying hostile environments.  Hence the degree of collateral censorship should, in theory, be
less in these cases.
33. For an account of the connections between hostile environments and job segregation in
the workplace, see Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 Yale L.J. 1683,
1756–61 (1998).  As Schultz points out, “[h]ostile work environment harassment is an endemic
feature of the workplace that is both engendered by, and further entrenches, the sex segregation of
work.”  Id. at 1760.
34. I am indebted to Vicki Schultz for this argument.
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enforces this result through subtle and not-so-subtle forms of
discrimination and harassment.  Together the employer and
employees construct the opportunity that women have in the
workplace, creating a single, undifferentiated harm to workplace
opportunity.
Congress has a right to prevent this result.  Title VII gives
women and minorities an equal right to pursue work and an equal
right to workplace opportunities.  Through Title VII, Congress and
the courts have imposed on all employers an obligation to guarantee
their employees a workplace free from sexual discrimination and
harassment, whether caused by managers or by co-workers—just as
OSHA regulations require employers to guarantee a workplace free
from defective health and safety conditions caused by management
or by co-workers.  Employers must take steps to achieve
nondiscriminatory workplaces, and this includes restricting employee
speech and behavior that contribute to a hostile working
environment.  In effect, Congress has required employers to produce
a certain kind of business culture in the workplace.  The Supreme
Court’s recent decisions in Ellerth and Faragher confirm this:
Employers are strongly encouraged to create anti-harassment policies
and complaint procedures as methods of monitoring their workers.35
The speech and behavior of individual employees is integral to the
production of that culture, and the employer is in the best position to
manage that culture, just as the employers have always managed
business culture before the application of antidiscrimination laws.
In short, the problem of collateral censorship is really a question
of the justifications for vicarious liability for speech acts.  Because
there are abundant good reasons to hold employers liable for
employees’ creation of a hostile environment, the collateral
censorship produced by Title VII does not offend the First
Amendment.
II.  CAPTIVE AUDIENCES:  THE HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT AS A MECHANISM OF
JOB SEGREGATION
Even though hostile environment law does not involve
unconstitutional collateral censorship, critics have raised other, more
radical First Amendment objections.  These fall into three basic
categories.  First, the courts’ standard of abusive conduct is unduly
vague.  Second, sexual harassment doctrines are overbroad because
they prohibit speech that would clearly be protected outside the
workplace.  Third, sexual harassment doctrines make distinctions on
35. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 808–09 (1998).
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the basis of content and viewpoint.  On closer inspection, however,
none of these objections prove fatal.
The vagueness argument proves entirely too much:  It applies
equally to most judge-made communications torts.  For example,
speech is defamatory “if it tends . . . to lower [an individual] in the
estimation of the community or to deter third persons from
associating or dealing with him.”36  Intentional infliction of
emotional distress requires words or conduct “so outrageous in
character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible
bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly
intolerable in a civilized community . . . [where] recitation of the
facts to an average member of the community would arouse his
resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim,
‘Outrageous!’”37  A judicial standard that requires severe or
pervasive intimidation, ridicule, insult, and abuse does not seem
unduly vague in comparison with these torts.  In fact, much of the
objection to the vagueness of hostile environment doctrine seems
directed at the worry that employers will collaterally censor
employees.  Collateral censorship will certainly occur, but it does not
make hostile environment law unconstitutional, any more than it
makes defamation or securities fraud law unconstitutional.
The second argument—that harassing speech would be protected
outside of the workplace—is more promising.  But it, too, proves
unavailing.  Often speech that would be protected in the public
square becomes unprotected when it occurs in special social
situations involving special social roles.  If a White House intern
sleeps with the President and falsely denies it at a press conference,
her false statement is protected.  However, if she repeats the same
denial in an affidavit or on the witness stand, she can be prosecuted
for perjury.  The same words inserted into a new social context
create different responsibilities and different degrees of First
Amendment protection.
Sexually harassing speech that would be protected outside of the
workplace becomes unprotected within it because it occurs in a
particular relationship of economic and social dependence—the
employment relation—and because it involves a form of sex
discrimination that (1) materially alters the terms and conditions of
employment for women, (2) reinforces the lower status of women in
employment relationships, and (3) preserves gender stratification in
employment markets.  In short, like perjurious statements, speech
used to create a hostile working environment is unprotected not
because of its content, but because in the social context in which it
36. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 559 (1977).
37. Id. § 46 cmt. d.
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occurs, it is used as a method of employment discrimination.  To
understand why this is so, we must consider the purposes of
employment discrimination law in more detail.
Employment discrimination law protects multiple interests.  It
prevents harms to material or economic interests like salary and
working conditions.  But it is also concerned with the social status of
groups; it attempts to dismantle unjust forms of social stratification
in the workplace that are visited upon individual people.  These two
concerns are intimately connected.  Social stratification both within
and outside of the workplace is often reflected in workplace
arrangements that give some people greater material advantages and
economic opportunities than others.  In addition, stratification within
the workplace helps reproduce the social status and material
disadvantages of groups in the larger society:  The structure of the
workplace helps reinforce the social meanings of superiority and
inferiority that attach to being white or black, male or female.38
Title VII’s prohibition against sexual harassment is a prohibition
of a particular mechanism of sex discrimination.  It must be read in
light of Title VII’s larger purposes.  It would be a great mistake to
understand hostile environment doctrine simply as a set of rules
designed to preserve civility, to protect individual dignity, or to
prevent offense.  Sexual harassment is prohibited because it is a
status-enforcing mechanism—it employs offense, insult, and
indignity to maintain the inferior status of women.  Prohibitions on
the use of this mechanism are designed to dismantle social
subordination and to achieve civil equality, both within the
workplace and, through their effects on the structure of work, in
society as a whole.
Title VII protects against both material- and status-based harm
because material and status elements are inextricably intertwined in
the workplace, and cannot easily be separated.  This should not be
surprising:  Common sense tells us that people with large corner
offices do not receive lower salaries and reduced authority as a
tradeoff, and people in cubicles don’t get juicier work assignments as
compensation.  Rather, people with high status and esteem usually
also enjoy better salaries and working conditions.  Conversely,
38. As Vicki Schultz explains:
[M]en’s advantage in numerous spheres of life depends on their superior status in the
workplace; men’s status as superior wage earners and possessors of masculine work
competence is also central to mainstream definitions of masculinity.  Thus, it serves men’s
interests to monopolize the most highly rewarded forms of work for themselves, and hostile
work environment harassment provides a mechanism for doing so.  In this analysis, wage
work and work relations are not mere reflectors of gendered roles created elsewhere; they are
important institutions for reproducing both gender inequality and gender identity.
Schultz, supra note 33, at 1761 n.409.
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people lower in the hierarchy of the workplace usually enjoy less-
pleasant working conditions and lower compensation.
Because material benefits and social status are so deeply
interconnected in the workplace, status-based harms that
significantly alter people’s working conditions for the worse
constitute employment discrimination under Title VII.  That is why
there is nothing particularly unusual or special about hostile
environment liability.  Hostile environment situations are just a
special case of ordinary disparate treatment discrimination:  They are
harms to employees’ group status—imposed on account of their
membership in the group—that materially alter their working
conditions as individuals and, in the process, also reinforce the social
status of the group.39
People also reproduce group status distinctions outside the
workplace; for example, they engage in racist or misogynist speech
or other speech that perpetuates racial or gender stereotypes.  But the
First Amendment generally does not permit recovery for these harms
to group status.40  The First Amendment does permit recovery for
defamation, but largely for injury to individual reputation rather than
harm to group status.41
In the workplace, however, the First Amendment does allow
people to recover for harms to group status when (and only when)
such harms so materially alter workplace conditions that they
constitute employment discrimination under Title VII.  The test of
material alteration is the test of Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. and
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson:  The plaintiff must face a workplace
39. To be sure, some elements of hostile environments are not specifically directed at
women and minorities but nevertheless effectively deny them equal opportunity in the workplace.
These elements should be regarded as special cases of disparate impact discrimination, i.e., they
involve business conditions and business decisions that have a disparate impact on women and
minorities but are not justified by any business necessity.
40. This is implicit in the Supreme Court’s equation of speech producing these harms in the
public sphere with speech producing other varieties of offensiveness.  See R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391–92 (1992) (arguing that the First Amendment protects both hate speech
directed at Catholics and anti-Catholic bigots); see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414
(1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government
may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable.”).  The First Amendment may permit recovery for “fighting words,” or for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
571–72 (1942), but these categories are very limited and do not include all or even most racist or
misogynist speech.
41. Compare Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (discussing compelling
interest in protecting individual reputation), with Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 263–64
(1952) (upholding group libel statute).  Beauharnais has never been overruled but its precedential
value is generally thought doubtful, especially after New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964), and R.A.V.  See Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 12-12, at 861 n.2,
§ 12-17, at 921 n.9, § 12-17, at 926–27 (2d ed. 1988).
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“permeated with ‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult’
that is ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the
victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment’”
as judged by a reasonable person.42  The harms that a plaintiff suffers
in these situations are harms of group subordination and employment
discrimination; producing these harms is how subordination and
discrimination are performed.  Just as false speech before a jury is
punishable not merely because it is false but because false speech in
this setting is perjury, status-based harms in the workplace are
sanctionable not merely because they are offensive or affronts to
one’s dignity but because harms in this setting are mechanisms of
employment discrimination.  They are forms of disparate treatment
that help sustain job segregation in the workplace.
The method of employment discrimination we are concerned
with here operates by surrounding the worker in a hostile or abusive
environment that he or she cannot easily escape; hence the term
“hostile environment” liability.  Recognizing how employment
discrimination works through the creation of a hostile environment
helps us understand the connection between the underlying purposes
of Title VII—combating stratification and status reinforcement in the
workplace—and the doctrines of the First Amendment, which permit
content-based regulation to protect “captive audiences.”  Simply put,
a person trapped in a hostile work environment is a “captive
audience” for First Amendment purposes with respect to the speech
and conduct that produce the discrimination.  Put another way,
hostile environments do the work of job segregation by making
workers captive audiences.  Although courts created the captive
audience doctrine for other situations, it actually makes better sense
in the context of the workplace.43  Indeed, I shall now argue that this
42. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65, 67 (1986)).  It is important to emphasize that the law of sexual
harassment requires a relatively high threshold of emotional, dignitary, or other status-based harm
before the plaintiff states a valid claim that employment conditions have been materially altered
in violation of Title VII.  A high threshold is probably constitutionally necessary.  However, as
the Court pointed out in Harris, it need not constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress.
See id. at 21–23.
43. See J.M. Balkin, Some Realism about Pluralism:  Legal Realist Approaches to the First
Amendment, 1990 Duke L.J. 375, 424:
I suggest that we might do well to shift the paradigmatic case of the captive audience from the
passengers on the public buses or the child running through stations on the radio dial, to the
employee working for low wages in a tight job market who is sexually harassed by her
employer or co-worker.
See also Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1535 (M.D. Fla. 1991)
(“female workers . . . are a captive audience in relation to the speech that comprises the hostile
work environment.”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First
Amendment Dog That Didn’t Bark, 1994 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 43 (noting that although courts have
not done so, the case for extending captive audience designation to workplaces is strong);
Suzanne Sangree, Title VII Prohibitions Against Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment and the
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doctrine is best understood through the lens of Title VII’s purposes.
Generally speaking, people are captive audiences for First
Amendment purposes when they are unavoidably and unfairly
coerced into listening.  According to the Supreme Court, the
paradigmatic case of a captive audience involves assaultive speech
directed at the home.44  The Court’s other major example has been
people riding on public buses who cannot avoid looking at political
advertisements.45
Without further theorization, captive audience doctrine can be a
troublesome idea.  A broad reading of the captive audience doctrine
“would effectively empower a majority to silence dissidents simply
as a matter of personal predilections.”46  One could regulate
offensive speech based on rather vague notions of captivity.  Thus, it
is not surprising that First Amendment scholars have tried to recast
captive audience doctrine as really a doctrine limited to speech aimed
at the home, where courts view privacy concerns as at their highest.47
So understood, the “captive audience” doctrine is not about captive
audiences at all, but about the special nature of particular places like
the home.48
I believe that the articulation of the captive audience doctrine by
both courts and commentators has been mistaken.  It is both over-
and underinclusive.  There is nothing talismanic about the home for
purposes of captivity.  So-called captive audiences in the home can
throw away junk mailings, change the dial, activate v-chips, operate
First Amendment:  No Collision in Sight, 47 Rutgers L. Rev. 461, 515–18, 539–40 (1995)
(defending captive audience analysis of workplace harassment); Marcy Strauss, Redefining the
Captive Audience Doctrine, 19 Hastings Const. L.Q. 85, 89–103 (1991) (applying the doctrine to
workplace harassment); Marcy Strauss, Sexist Speech in the Workplace, 25 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L.
Rev. 1, 36 (1990) (arguing that employees “qualify for captive audience status”).
44. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988) (upholding ban on residential
picketing directed at a single house); see also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748–49
(1978) (upholding FCC sanctions for indecent broadcast against radio station playing George
Carlin’s “seven dirty words” monologue); Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S.
728, 737–38 (1970) (upholding Post Office provision that allowed individuals to specify to the
Postmaster General certain sexually explicit mailings they did not wish to receive); Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949) (upholding ban on sound trucks to protect residents).
45. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 301–04 (1974) (plurality opinion)
(upholding ban of political advertising on public buses on grounds that passengers are a “captive
audience”).
46. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
47. See Fallon, supra note 43, at 18–19 (describing the Court’s justification for these
restrictions as based on the “special characteristics of the home”); Volokh, Freedom of Speech,
supra note 1, at 1832–33 (arguing that the doctrine is properly limited to the home).
48. See Fallon, supra note 43, at 18 (“When the so-called captive audience cases are read in
conjunction, the character of the place seems more important than the degree of audience
‘captivity’ in explaining the applications of captive audience doctrine.”); Volokh, Freedom of
Speech, supra note 1, at 1833 (arguing that the Supreme Court has never upheld a captive
audience justification for content-based restrictions outside of the home).
FREE SPEECH AND HOSTILE ENVIRONMENTS 19
the channel blocking capabilities of cable boxes, install filtering
software, or, if all else fails, disconnect the cable service, turn off the
television, and stop subscribing to an Internet service provider.
Nor is the home an unalloyed example of “privacy.”  In the
Information Age, we increasingly receive information in our homes
rather than in public spaces.  New technologies like the Internet
redraw and even collapse the boundaries between public and private
spaces.  One can participate in public discourse and public
deliberation while sitting at the keyboard dressed in one’s underwear.
This was already true with respect to television; it is even more true
in the case of interactive media like the Internet.  In most cases the
protection of children and parental control over children are much
better justifications for regulation of content than captive audience
doctrine.49
Conversely, limiting captive audience situations to the home
misses the point of the metaphor of captivity—that a person must
listen to speech because he or she is practically unable to leave.
Children may be subject to discipline in the home, but for most
adults, the place they are most subject to the discipline of others and
least free to leave is at work.  Economic coercion leaves many
workers unable to avoid exposure to harassing speech.  Employees
are a much better example of a captive audience than the so-called
paradigm case of people sitting in their homes.
Captivity in this sense is a matter of practicality rather than
necessity.  It is about the right not to have to flee rather than the
inability to flee.  The Supreme Court has suggested that people riding
in buses subjected to political advertisements were a captive
audience; but surely these people could have chosen other forms of
transportation albeit at greater expense and inconvenience.  Even
people in their homes are not physically prevented from leaving
them.  The point of captive audience doctrine, however, is that they
should not have to be put to such a choice.  The coercion brought
upon them is unfair.  In like fashion, minimum wage workers may
have to move from job to job to avoid harassment.  But the question
is not whether there is another equally low-paying job available.  The
question is whether they should have to leave a job to avoid being
sexually harassed.50  It would undermine the central purpose of Title
49. See J.M. Balkin, Media Filters, the V-Chip, and the Foundations of Broadcast
Regulation, 45 Duke L.J. 1131, 1137–39 (1996).
50. Vicki Schultz has described the “revolving door” phenomenon of women in low paying
jobs who are continually forced to change jobs because of sex discrimination or harassment.  See
Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories about Women and Work:  Judicial Interpretations of Sex
Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103
Harv. L. Rev. 1749, 1826 n.287, 1839 (1990).  These women find themselves on a perpetual
exodus from jobs that are “a dime a dozen.”  The phenomenon of these forced exits is not an
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VII to argue that it gave workers no right to stay in a job free from
sexual harassment.  Moreover, as noted before, the kind of
employment discrimination at issue here promotes gender
segregation in job opportunities precisely by surrounding the plaintiff
in a hostile environment of speech and conduct.  If the plaintiff’s
only remedy is to leave, the mechanisms of job segregation will
simply proceed unabated.
Captive audience doctrine should not focus on particular spaces
like the home.  Rather, it should regulate particular situations where
people are particularly subject to unjust and intolerable harassment
and coercion.  Captive audience doctrine, like the doctrines of Fourth
Amendment privacy, should protect people in coercive situations, not
places.51  “The workplace” is not a place; it is a set of social relations
of power and privilege, which may or may not have a distinct
geographical nexus.  If a male supervisor makes an obscene phone
call from his home to a female subordinate in a hotel room, this
unwelcome behavior can and should contribute to a hostile work
environment, even though both supervisor and subordinate are miles
away from the office.  Geographical proximity may be relevant to
our judgments of the unreasonableness of a practice and the
discomfort produced by it, but it is hardly necessary to achieve sex
discrimination.  As the workplace becomes more and more mediated
by e-mail and the Internet, the geographical conception of captive
audience doctrine will become increasingly unwieldy.  The
telecommunications revolution we are currently undergoing should
help us recognize that what is at stake are social relations of power
and dependence which, for convenience, we identify with a
geographical metaphor.52
The practical necessities of earning a living and the economic
coercion inherent in the social relations of the workplace create
captive audience situations; but this does not mean that the
workplace itself should be treated as a First Amendment-free zone.
In fact, the workplace should be an arena of special, not lessened,
argument against the application of captive audience doctrine to harassment law; it is an argument
for it.
51. Cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment “protects people, not places”).
52. Deborah Epstein emphasizes the physical context of the workplace as important to
captive audience doctrine.  She reports that she can find no example of a post-Vinson case in
which communications outside the workplace contributed to a hostile environment finding.  See
Deborah Epstein, Can a “Dumb Ass Woman” Achieve Equality in the Workplace?  Running the
Gauntlet of Hostile Environment Harassing Speech, 84 Geo. L.J. 399, 421–23 & n.128 (1996).
But cf. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 940 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (pre-Vinson case in which
supervisor’s call to employee at her home was part of hostile environment in conjunction with
other abusive speech at workplace).  Of course, the problem is what we will consider the
workplace to be as more and more people work in geographically separated places.
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free speech protection.  Precisely because people spend so much of
their lives in the workplace, the workplace is an important site of
public discourse.53  Much employee speech in the workplace is not,
nor should it be considered, exclusively “managerial,”
“instrumental,” or “private.”  We may talk more about public
matters, sports, gossip, politics, and the affairs of the day at our
workplace than we do at home.  The problem with existing
employment law is that it gives employers too much power to control
the speech of employees on every subject, not simply on matters of
sex and sexuality.
One way of justifying sexual harassment liability in the
workplace would be to make a categorical distinction between the
world of public discourse and the world of the workplace.  Thus, one
might argue that “there are good reasons for the law to regard
persons as autonomous within the context of political deliberation,
but there are equally good reasons for the law to regard persons as
dependent within the workplace.”54  However, because the
workplace is also an important site of public discourse, the law
cannot simply insist that workers are to be regarded as dependent in
all their speech interactions in workplace settings.  Otherwise,
Congress could regulate virtually all workplace speech.  Put in the
language of captive audience doctrine, workers would be captive
audiences for all purposes.
That is why it is important to understand that the basis of captive
audience doctrine is social relations rather than geographical places.
Sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination that maintains
sexual stratification and that occurs in the context of the economic
dependency of work relations.  Put another way, sexual harassment is
a device through which sexual stratification of the workplace is
achieved or maintained, using the economic dependency of workers
as a powerful form of leverage.  Thus, the law may regard workers as
dependent and not autonomous with respect to speech that helps
achieve or maintain such stratification, but not with respect to other
speech.
Critics of hostile environment liability miss this point, I think,
when they argue that “[h]arassment law, if viewed as an attempt to
protect a captive audience, is . . . underinclusive” because it only
applies to speech that “creates a hostile environment based on race,
53. See Cynthia Estlund, Freedom of Expression in the Workplace and the Problem of
Discriminatory Harassment, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 687, 717–18 (1997).  Indeed, Kent Greenawalt
argues that workers are “captive speakers,” because they may have few other places to express
themselves, and because “[w]hen people are working, the only place they can express themselves
is within the workplace.”  Kent Greenawalt, Fighting Words 86 (1995) (emphasis omitted).
54. Robert C. Post, The Perils of Conceptualism:  A Response to Professor Fallon, 103
Harv. L. Rev. 1744, 1746 (1990).
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sex, religion or national origin.”55  The point is precisely that people
are almost never captive audiences for every purpose, even in the
workplace.  They are only captive audiences in the workplace with
respect to certain forms of unjust coercion that use the employee’s
economic dependence as a springboard.  Sex discrimination is one of
those situations.  Another is the use of economic coercion to prevent
or hinder decisions about unionization, as illustrated in labor cases
like NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.56
In Gissel the Supreme Court upheld an NLRB order requiring an
employer to bargain with a union that had lost an election.  The
election was held to be tainted by the employer’s truthful statements
that election of a union could lead to closing of the employer’s plant
or, if the union called a strike, to a transfer of operations.  Professor
Kingsley Browne, a critic of hostile environment liability, insists that
“[t]he reasoning of Gissel does not support a general governmental
right to regulate speech in the workplace.”57  I quite agree.  Gissel
holds only that when unfair employment practices make use of the
coercion already inherent in the employment relationship—including
practices involving truthful statements—the government may step in
to regulate workplace speech in order to promote equality values.
The same is true of captive audience doctrine as applied to the
workplace.  Captive audience doctrine is best understood as limited
to employment situations where speech and conduct together will
help perpetuate job segregation or other forms of employment
discrimination that Congress has a right to prevent, just as in Gissel
Congress had a right to prevent attempts to hinder employees from
bargaining freely.58
In short, we should not confuse the economic dependence of
employees with their ability to participate in public discourse about
the things that matter to them.  Precisely because workers are
economically dependent within the workplace, but engage in public
discourse there, Congress might want to make them more
autonomous within the workplace by guaranteeing them certain
speech rights against their employers.  This means, for example, that
political speech by employees should be exempted as a basis for
hostile environment liability as a matter of statutory construction and
that Congress might even want to take positive steps to protect such
speech from retribution by employers.59
55. Volokh, Freedom of Speech, supra note 1, at 1843.
56. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
57. Browne, Title VII as Censorship, supra note 1, at 514.
58. See Gissel, 395 U.S. at 618.
59. Political speech might be defined as speech intended to contribute to a discussion of
public issues.  The example that begins Professor Browne’s article—“Women do not belong in
the medical profession; they should stay home and make babies!”—would presumably qualify
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Clearly some political speech can help contribute to sexual
stratification in the workplace, at least at the margins.  But it is
unlikely that in most cases it is the major contributor.  Working
through the facts of actual cases, one is more likely to find pranks,
taunts, sexual suggestions, and personal invective than political
agitation as the basic technology for creating hostile environments.60
Because political speech is valuable, and because it contributes only
marginally to sexual stratification, courts should exempt it.61  Doing
so may also ameliorate some of the effects of collateral censorship,
because employers can be assured that they will not be held liable for
explicit political rhetoric by their employees.62
Some commentators have tried to offer a distinction between
directed and non-directed speech; that is, between speech specifically
directed at a particular individual or a particular set of individuals
(such as face-to-face insults), and speech that is not.63  Only the
former can form the basis of hostile environment liability, while the
latter is exempted.  I think a better distinction is between “open” and
“hidden” speech; that is, between speech that openly contributes to
preserving sexual stratification—putting women in their place—and
speech that is relegated to private consumption by willing
participants or private conversation among willing listeners either at
the workplace or away from it.  Take the case of pornography, the
classic example of non-directed speech.  Employees who keep
under such an exemption if offered in a debate with a co-worker.  Browne, Title VII as
Censorship, supra note 1, at 481.  Nevertheless, such a statement would certainly be evidence of
intent to discriminate in a disparate treatment case if spoken by a supervisor and the person to
whom it was spoken was subsequently denied a promotion.
Although I argue for exclusion of political speech as a matter of statutory construction in order
to avoid potential constitutional difficulties, Kent Greenawalt takes a somewhat different
approach.  He has argued that we should make a distinction between a male construction worker
who occasionally says to a female co-worker, “they should never have allowed women in these
jobs,” and one who repeatedly greets her with this slogan every morning, even after she
complains that she is an unwilling listener.  Greenawalt, supra note 53, at 90–91.  Greenawalt
argues that even such (arguably) political speech that contributes to public discourse could
become part of a hostile environment in these situations, because we could properly infer that the
speaker’s intention was to harass or annoy rather than to express an opinion.
60. See Epstein, supra note 52, at 406–08 (describing recurring fact patterns in a number of
cases).
61. Cf. Fallon, supra note 43, at 47 (arguing for a somewhat narrower exemption for speech
“‘reasonably designed or intended to contribute to reasoned debate on issues of public concern’”)
(citing Harvard Law School’s draft Guidelines Concerning Sexual Harassment).
62. Nevertheless, for reasons described below, employers may not take up this opportunity
to lessen workplace speech rules.
63. See, e.g., Michael P. McDonald, Unfree Speech, 18 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 479, 485
(1995) (“Speech uttered that is not directed toward specific individuals should never be regulated
as harassment.”); Strossen, supra note 2, at 718 (noting importance of distinction between
directed and non-directed expression); Volokh, Freedom of Speech, supra note 1, at 1846, 1868–
69 (arguing that personal, directed, face-to-face insults and sexual propositions are regulable;
non-directed speech, even if it cannot be avoided, is not regulable).
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pornography in their desk drawers out of sight should be
distinguished from employees who keep pornography prominently
displayed around the workplace where co-workers are likely to see it.
Male employees who tell each other dirty jokes not intended to be
overheard by female co-workers should be treated differently than
employees who do so openly in order to distress and offend their
female counterparts.  The point is that some speech is not intended
for general consumption, particularly speech that occurs out of public
view and away from other co-workers.  Employees can avoid
exposure to this speech with relatively little effort and the burden
should be on them to do so.  Thus, as a matter of statutory
construction, and in order to avoid constitutional problems, courts
should not consider “hidden” or “non-public” speech between
willing participants as constituting a hostile environment, even if it is
not overtly political in character.  The same should apply to “after-
hours” speech and gossip between willing participants that is not
intended to be overheard by co-workers.64
One reason why the open/hidden distinction is superior to the
directed/non-directed distinction is that the former is more in keeping
with the purposes of hostile environment liability.  Recall that an
individual employee’s comment or expression may not by itself
constitute a hostile environment, but many different acts taken
together can.  This makes sense because, from the perspective of the
female or black employee, the hostility of environment is
experienced as a whole, not in isolated bits.  It is the environment as
a whole—and the felt sense that women or minorities are poorly
regarded or unwelcome in the workplace—that preserves or
maintains sexual or racial stratification.  Thus, the open/hidden
distinction imagines the cumulative effect of expression from the
perspective of the victim of the hostile environment, who
experiences it as a gestalt.  By contrast, the directed/non-directed
distinction looks at the issue of hostile environment from the
perspective of the individual perpetrator, who may well not
understand how his or her non-directed expression contributes to an
overall feeling of unwelcomeness or second-class citizenship.
64. Nevertheless, such speech might be evidence of sex discrimination, or of other speech or
conduct that would constitute a hostile environment.  The directed/non-directed distinction
becomes more significant with respect to this latter question.  If two male employees tell dirty
jokes to each other out of earshot, that is not very probative of whether they are contributing to a
hostile environment in other contexts.  But if they tell dirty jokes about one of their female co-
workers, that may well be relevant.  E-mail provides a particularly good example.  If two male
employees send each other private e-mail messages describing a female movie star’s particular
charms in graphic detail, that is quite different from a discussion about one of their co-workers.
Obviously many employers might wish to restrict or prohibit non-work-related discussions using
company e-mail for any number of reasons, but certainly one is the possibility that such e-mail
messages will later be used as evidence in a hostile environment case.
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Although commentators have made much of the distinction
between directed and non-directed speech, this distinction will
probably matter little to employees in practice, because of collateral
censorship.  Employers may well decide that pornography should be
kept out of the workplace entirely, whether or not it is thrust in the
face of unwilling co-workers; they may collaterally censor their
employees from non-directed as well as directed speech as an extra
precaution.  But, as argued before, this collateral censorship is not
unconstitutional.
There is thus a certain irony in advocating the directed/non-
directed distinction and raising a collateral censorship objection, as
critics of hostile environment liability sometimes do.  If collateral
censorship is really a constitutional problem, as the critics insist it is,
it will not be eliminated by restricting liability to directed expression.
Indeed, I would go even further and argue that many employers
may not even respect the open/hidden distinction fully in their
policies.  For example, it is entirely possible that many employers
will choose to prohibit the private possession of pornography at
work, even if it is kept hidden at all times.  On the other hand,
employers are much more likely to respect the open/hidden
distinction in other ways:  Employers might well decide that what
employees say after hours or out of earshot of unwilling listeners on
their lunch break is their own concern.
The final constitutional objection to hostile environment law is
that its judge-made doctrines are content- and viewpoint-based.
Once again, this proves too much:  The same charge could be leveled
against defamation, fraud, and most other communications torts.
Juries in defamation cases are required to make content-based
judgments about what kinds of statements would hold people up to
shame or ridicule in the community and to assess damages based on
the degree of injury to reputation.  Moreover, liability for defamation
clearly depends on viewpoint.  If a defendant falsely says “Smith is a
crook,” she may be subject to liability, but not if she falsely says
“Smith is an honest man.”
If status-based harms are to be protected at all, some content-
based and even viewpoint-based distinctions are inevitable.  As we
have seen, Title VII appropriately protects workers from a limited
class of status-based harms because protecting workers from these
harms is essential to guaranteeing equality in the workplace.  Thus, it
makes perfect sense that a sign saying “Sarah is Employee of the
Month” should not give rise to liability, while a sign reading “Sarah
is a dumb-ass woman”65 could form part of a hostile environment
case.  These content-based distinctions are adapted to the very reason
65. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 19 (1993).
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why status-based or dignitary harms may be protected in the first
place.66
III.  THE DEEPER ISSUE:  EMPLOYER CONTROL
Critics of sexual harassment law have offered many horror
stories about employer censorship.  Most of these involve employer
decisions that are overzealous, reflect traditional or puritanical sexual
mores at odds with Title VII’s promise of sexual equality, are
products of mindless bureaucracy, or are plain idiotic.67  They have
not been required either by the actual doctrines of Title VII or by
prudent compliance policies.  Nor is this surprising.  By and large
federal judges have been quite careful to limit liability for hostile
environments to situations of severe or pervasive worker abuse.
Indeed, feminist legal scholars have criticized judges for construing
the law too narrowly.68
There is some irony in libertarian complaints about employees’
freedom of speech.  In America the state has generally offered very
little protection for employee speech.  The traditional common law
rule has been that employees can be fired at will absent a contractual
provision to the contrary; in other words, unless employees have
sufficient bargaining power to demand “just cause” or other security
provisions in their contract, the employer can sanction or fire them
for virtually any reason,69 including displeasure with their speech,
even their political speech.  The common law regime is still the
default rule today, and it provides employers with one of their most
potent weapons for shaping the culture of the workplace and the
behavior of their employees.  American law is in marked contrast
with that of many other countries.  In Europe, for example,
66. Cf. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) (arguing that content-based
discrimination within a category of unprotected speech is justified when it furthers the purpose
for which the speech is unprotected).  Not surprisingly, even Professor Volokh drops his
objections to content- and viewpoint-based restrictions on harassment when the harassment is
directed at a particular person.  See Volokh, Freedom of Speech, supra note 1, at 1866–67.
Note, moreover, that under the logic of R.A.V., Congress is permitted to limit recovery for
harassment only for those forms of employment discrimination that it prohibits, but not for
harassment based on other subjects or based on other elements of a person’s identity.  Hence, one
may not argue that Title VII is unconstitutionally content-based because it does not cover
harassment on all subjects, but only on the basis of race, sex, national origin, and religion.
Congress is permitted to decide that discrimination on those grounds is more unjust, inflicts
greater or more distinctive harms on its victims, or causes greater social problems than other
forms of discrimination which it has chosen not to prohibit.  See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S.
476, 487–88 (1993).
67. For a parade of horribles, see Volokh, What Speech, supra note 1, at 642–46.
68. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 52, at 416–17 & n.113 (noting that scope of judicial
enforcement has been “narrow” and “excessively restrained”).
69. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Free Speech and Due Process in the Workplace, 71 Ind. L. Rev.
101, 116–17 (1995).
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employees often enjoy more substantial rights against arbitrary
discharge.70
Thus, sexual harassment doctrines do not pose a simple conflict
between some employees’ liberty and other employees’ equality.
The question is not whether employees will have freedom of speech,
but how employers will control employee speech—whether they will
do so in response to the incentives produced by Title VII or for their
own purposes.
Blaming employee censorship on Title VII diverts our attention
from a larger issue:  Employers exercise considerable and sometimes
tyrannical control over the speech and behavior of their employees.
Throughout history American employers often have been deeply
interested in control over their workers and in the culture of the
workplace.  They are no less interested than the government in
inculcating social norms of appropriate speech and behavior.  Often
they go even further, imposing elaborate dress codes and rules of
social etiquette.  They seek to inculcate norms they believe will
increase or sustain productivity.  Employers tend to like employees
who are “team players” and work for the good of the enterprise.
They will even tolerate employee behavior that is racist, sexist,
unjust, or anti-social, as long as it promotes workplace cohesion and
morale and is not bad for business.
In fact, the most important counterweights to the employer’s
power to shape workplace culture through hiring and firing decisions
are antidiscrimination laws.  Without the incentives created by sexual
harassment law, employees are simply remitted to the economic and
social control of employers.  In other words, First Amendment
challenges to sexual harassment law are a defense of employer
prerogatives presented in the guise of worker liberties.
In the long run, employers will not necessarily lose much control
over the workplace because of sexual harassment law.  To the
contrary, compliance with government regulation is often not a
danger but an opportunity.  Employers will use sexual harassment
law as a new device for controlling their subordinates, by combining
legal compliance with other bureaucratic and economic goals.  Many
tales of unjust compliance practices can be understood in precisely
this way.  The excuse of sexual harassment liability allows
employers to impose ever new controls on employee behavior during
an age when employees are spending more and more time at work
and tend to rely more and more on the workplace to meet their
partners.
70. See, e.g., Frances Raday, Individual and Collective Dismissal—A Job Security
Dichotomy, 10 Comp. Lab. L. 121, 132 (1989) (noting that many European countries recognize
the right to job security as a fundamental employment right).
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When First Amendment challenges are raised to sexual
harassment law, civil libertarians should not be diverted from the
deeper issues of employer control and employee freedom.  We can
protect the First Amendment best by following the law as it is
written—by awarding damages only in cases where severe or
pervasive abuse materially alters employment conditions.  But we
should also not forget to protect employees—all employees—by
working for greater speech rights against their employers than
American law has seen fit to give them.  For many employees, those
are the speech rights that really count.
